For anyone who teaches the philosophy of law this is an indispensible volume. Currie's intent is to provide a critical history of the Court's constitutional work for the first hundred years. In writing that history he displays the multiple methods of constitutional analysis and the techniques of opinion writing employed under seven Supreme Court justices. Not surprisingly, he concludes that judicial performance is not uniform. Currie makes no attempt to hide the vantage point from which he is writing. He assumes (...) that the Constitution is a law binding the judges no less than the other officials whose action the Court undertakes to review. He flatly states his conviction that judges have no right to ignore those constitutional limitations with which they disagree and adds that when Congress has acted within the powers granted by the Constitution, it is not for the Court to interfere. The same is true for state laws that do not offend the Constitution. "It follows," says Currie, "that the judges have no more right to invent limitations not found in the Constitution than to disregard those put there by the Framers. In short, when a judge swears to uphold the Constitution, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by someone else.". (shrink)